FAFT AML Deficient

No longer on list

Higher Risk Areas


Non - Compliance with FATF 40 + 9 Recommendations

Not on EU White list equivalent jurisdictions

Corruption Index (Transparency International & W.G.I.)

World Governance Indicators (Average Score)

Failed States Index (Political Issues)(Average Score)

Medium Risk Areas

US Dept of State Money Laundering Assessment

Weakness in Government Legislation to combat Money Laundering





FATF Status

Algeria is no longer on the FATF List of Countries that have been identified as having strategic AML deficiencies


Latest FATF Statement - 19 February 2016

The FATF welcomes Algeria’s significant progress in improving its AML/CFT regime and notes that Algeria has established the legal and regulatory framework to meet its commitments in its action plan regarding the strategic deficiencies that the FATF had identified in October 2011. Algeria is therefore no longer subject to the FATF’s monitoring process under its on-going global AML/CFT compliance process. Algeria will work with MENAFATF as it continues to address the full range of AML/CFT issues identified in its mutual evaluation report.


Compliance with FATF Recommendations

The last Mutual Evaluation Report relating to the implementation of anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing standards in Algeria was undertaken by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 2011. According to that Evaluation, Algeria was deemed Compliant for 3 and Largely Compliant for 8 of the FATF 40 + 9 Recommendations. It was Partially Compliant or Non-Compliant for 5 of the 6 Core Recommendations.


US Department of State Money Laundering assessment (INCSR)

Algeria was deemed a Jurisdiction of Concern by the US Department of State 2016 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR).

Key Findings from the report are as follows: -


Perceived Risks:

The extent of money laundering through formal financial institutions in Algeria is thought to be minimal due to stringent exchange control regulations; the considerable size of the informal and cash-based economy, estimated to be 30-50 percent of GDP; and, a banking sector dominated by state-owned banks, archaic paper-based systems, and banking officials trained in the statist system. The restricted convertibility of the Algerian dinar enables the central bank to monitor all international financial operations carried out by public and private banking institutions. Notable criminal activity includes trafficking, particularly of drugs and cigarettes, but also arms and stolen vehicles; kidnapping for ransom; theft; extortion; and embezzlement. Public corruption remains a serious concern, as does terrorism in specific areas of the country. Algerian authorities are increasingly concerned by cases of customs fraud and trade-based money laundering. Other risk areas for financial crimes include unregulated alternative remittance and currency exchange systems and a cash-based economy. Most money laundering is believed to occur primarily through tax evasion, abuse of real estate transactions, and commercial invoice fraud.

On October 23, 2015, the FATF removed Algeria from its Public Statement. The FATF recognized Algeria’s significant progress and the improvement in its AML/CFT regime. The FATF also indicated Algeria has substantially addressed its action plan





There are no international sanctions currently in force against this country.


The Arab League (comprising 22 Arab member states), of which this country is a member, has approved imposing sanctions on Syria. These include: -

-      Cutting off transactions with the Syrian central bank

-      Halting funding by Arab governments for projects in Syria

-      A ban on senior Syrian officials travelling to other Arab countries

-      A freeze on assets related to President Bashar al-Assad's government

The declaration also calls on Arab central banks to monitor transfers to Syria, with the exception of remittances from Syrians abroad.


The Arab League has also boycotted Israel in a systematic effort to isolate Israel economically in support of the Palestinians, however, the implementation of the boycott has varied over time among member states. There are three tiers to the boycott. The primary boycott prohibits the importation of Israeli-origin goods and services into boycotting countries. The secondary boycott prohibits individuals, as well as private and public sector firms and organizations, in member countries from engaging in business with any entity that does business in Israel. The Arab League maintains a blacklist of such firms. The tertiary boycott prohibits any entity in a member country from doing business with a company or individual that has business dealings with U.S. or other firms on the Arab League blacklist.







Rating (100-Good / 0-Bad)

Transparency International Corruption Index


World Governance Indicator – Control of Corruption






INVESTMENT CLIMATE - Executive Summary (US State Department)

Algeria remains a potentially lucrative but uncertain and challenging market for many U.S. businesses, especially those with little experience in the Middle East and North Africa. While hydrocarbons are still the backbone of the Algerian economy, accounting for 98% of exports, 40-45% of GDP and 70% of budget revenues, there are opportunities in numerous other sectors including (but not limited to) agriculture, infrastructure, housing, alternative energy, pharmaceuticals and recycling. The IMF has predicted that unless GOA diversifies its hydrocarbon-based economy, by 2016/7 decreasing exports and falling hydrocarbon revenues will prevent GOA from meeting its current budgetary and subsidy obligations. GOA is sensitive to this projection and is acting, however tentatively and inefficiently, to begin the diversification process. This is the proverbial “ground floor” that presents significant opportunity for American companies in virtually every sector of the economy.

Companies must overcome the language barrier, distance, vagaries and corruption with the customs systems, an entrenched bureaucracy, and price/quality competition from Chinese, Turkish, and European businesses. International firms already here complain that the GOA lacks an economic vision and that laws and regulations both are constantly shifting and are applied unevenly, raising the perception of commercial risk for foreign investors. Business contracts are likewise subject to interpretation and revision, which has proved challenging to U.S. and international firms. The 49/51 law (requiring majority Algerian ownership of most businesses), insufficient IPR enforcement, Algeria’s closed borders and limited regional trade is another drawback, because the Algerian market on its own may not be attractive to firms that can locate elsewhere and create a regional distribution hub (e.g., the Singapore model). By some estimates, the informal economy controls 40-50 percent of the consumer goods market. Informal sector dominance, which supports an influx of cheap and/or counterfeit goods, makes it difficult for more expensive, genuine U.S. products to compete.


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